Resalat newspaper in its editorial on November 22 focused on the complexity, or rather lack thereof, associated with the ongoing nuclear talks, stressing that talks over Iran’s nuclear program are originally part of a simple problem which requires a simple solution, but that other factors have complicated the negotiating process. The following is a partial translation of the editorial:

[…]

The multiple-variable equation emerging in the talks is not the direct result of an innate complexity of the nuclear talks, nor is it because of extraterrestrial or metaphysical factors!

“Complexification of nuclear talks” is a process spearheaded by the West in three areas: “Official diplomacy”, “Public diplomacy” and “Secret diplomacy”.

That a simple equation has turned into one with multiple variables is not the consequence of a hard riddle; rather, it has been created as a result of the complex role played by those involved in the talks.

[…]

[As the talks are coming closer to their end,] negotiators may encounter the following in the remaining days: “total breakdown of the talks”, “conclusion of a final deal”, “finalization of an interim deal identical to the Geneva Agreement”, and “an agreement on general outlines”.

As things stand, the first two options seem out of the question. On the one hand, P5+1 believes that it is far from logical to walk away from the talks now that they have made some breakthroughs, and on the other hand, preconditions needed to reach a final, detailed deal are practically impossible to meet.

Excessive demands by Washington and failure of P5+1 to make up their mind in a real, diplomatic way to guarantee the conclusion of a final deal are largely to blame for the suspenseful state of affairs.

This situation has pushed the last two options into the game. In other words, “a reason for extension”, and not the extension itself, will be the main dividing line between Vienna talks (the one prior to the first deadline back in July) and the current negotiations (ahead of the second deadline on November 24).

This cuts both ways. On the upside, it would offer a bigger chance [to Iran] to concentrate more on gaps and not to get excited in dealing with the West (the party with excessive demands in the talks).

On the downside, however, it would create fissures in nuclear talks and produce fresh frictions. More importantly, failure by the US to make a crucial decision coupled by feet-dragging on the part of Washington and its fellow P5+1 members – which keeps them stuck in the talks which were held ahead of a first deadline – clearly indicates that they are not yet ready to accept the inalienable rights of the Iranian nation. Under these circumstances, Iran’s lack of confidence in P5+1 is growing progressively.

The sway the ill-intentioned regional and international players hold with what is going on in the nuclear talks explains why the parties involved still remain split and why members of P5+1 are trying to put a spanner in the works.

There are glaring examples which reveal the true colors of the players who have sat around the negotiating table facing Iranian diplomats, among them: A recent backchannel warning by Saudi officials to Paris that Riyadh would decrease its arms purchases from France in case a nuclear deal is signed with Iran; extensive consultations between the Zionist regime and US officials; and [the formation of] a European troika trying hard to prevent the conclusion of a deal with Iran.

In the meantime, other factors are also responsible for the creation and continuation of the current state of affairs: the passive role Russia and China play in the talks, and in some cases Moscow’s deterring role in resolving the outstanding questions such as the way Iran’s basic needs are to be met and the way the UN Security Council sanctions [against Iran] should be lifted (something which arises from miscalculations by Russia and China merely seeking to serve their own interests).

At this point it is clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran should not let its guard down in dealing with ill-intentioned players in the nuclear talks.

Also, P5+1 members should bear in mind that the destructive role they play in doubting the unquestionable rights of the Iranian nation is closely watched in the court of the world public opinion.

Deep-seated popular distrust of the US and its European allies, and the serious questions [the Iranian nation] wants to put to Russia and China should be the first and foremost priority of the Iranian team when they sit down for nuclear talks.

Backpedalling from this attitude, which has been adopted based on the lofty teachings of the Islamic Revolution and comments of the late Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader, would prompt the other party to display more rebellious intransigence and ask for more concessions.

The editorialist of Kayhan argues that imposition of unfair sanctions against Iran was not simply because of Iran’s nuclear program – rather those sanctions were rooted in the hegemonic nature of the US administration and the revolutionary nature of our country.

On the campaign trail when candidate Rouhani raised hopes by promising that sanctions would be lifted, seasoned individuals knew that those simplistic pledges would lead nowhere. They also knew that the victory of Hassan Rouhani in presidential elections would result in no changes in America’s policies to favor Iran’s interests.

Without naming names, the editorialist recalls the early months of Rouhani’s presidency and says, “Back then, simply by virtue of opposition [to the olive-branch approach of President Rouhani and his colleagues] you would be accused as benefitting from continued sanctions.” But more than one year on, the pessimistic can easily see that those statements were anything but the truth!

Hossein Shamsian, the editorialist who seems to have little hope of talks between Iran and P5+1 producing a deal in Vienna, or even at a later stage – In fact, he seems to have been pessimistic about a solution to the dispute in the first place – says what candidate Rouhani said on the campaign trail was different from what actually happened. The president had said, “The wheels of people’s lives should spin, so should the centrifuges.” The solution to the nuclear issue lies in direct talks with the headman [a reference to the US], he argues.

Thanks to gray areas in the Geneva Interim Agreement, which has been the basis of talks over the past year, scope of enrichment and not “removal of sanctions” has been given priority in the negotiations.

Kayhan, which is widely known to reflect the viewpoints of principlists and the most important political and policymaking center in the Islamic Republic of Iran, goes on to describe efforts made in 10 rounds of nuclear talks so far, and says: “So far, the agenda of the talks has changed much to our detriment. Besides, the hasty drafting of the Geneva Agreement resulted in nothing but serious restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, loss of a large chunk of the country’s nuclear treasure in return for some words, and of course the return of a few billion dollars of our own money in long-term installments.

“Still, that is not all. Over the past year since the conclusion of the deal, despite all its shortcomings, the agreement has not been implemented equally by both sides. As the president has said by the admission of senior Western officials Tehran has acted in full compliance with its commitments, but P5+1, especially the US, have time and again ignored their commitments and taken new hostile measures against Iran such as imposition of sanctions and disruption to Iranian trade.”

The editorial goes on to say, “In these circumstances, now that we are at a sensitive juncture to secure a deal, a few points are worth mentioning about the Vienna talks:

1. America has implied, in the clearest language possible, that it is not trustworthy. How can one be clearer? President Obama signed an extension to Iran sanctions, and US senators sent a letter to President Obama calling on him to put Iran’s missile program on the agenda of the talks.

2. As talks continue and we keep making concessions, America’s international arms, that is to say the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency, are pulling out all the stops in cooperating with the West. They are trying to set the stage, legally, for imposition of America’s will on the Iranian people. The biased and untruthful report of the UN nuclear agency which comes on the back of numerous inspections suggests that the IAEA is unable to comment on the nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

3. Some anti-national-interests behaviors and comments at home have prompted Americans to believe we need to strike a deal at any cost. Such an approach has simply given rise to the excessive demands of the enemy. They don’t even bother to pay attention to the approach of the Iranian government, the numerous concessions it has made and the broken taboos, the most glaring example of which is the American failure to grant visa to Iran’s choice as representative to the United Nations.

4. As Sirus Nasseri [a senior nuclear negotiator during the presidency of Reformist Mohammad Khatami] has said haste in drafting the agreement, like what happened in the first Geneva deal, is an experience that should not be repeated. Concerns that a hastily-drafted deal might not be legally compelling enough and thus be open to interpretation and abuse, are legitimate.

5. What people expected from so many comings and goings and several rounds of talks which involved the breaking of the taboo of holding talks with the Great Satan was not a few photos with the US secretary of state or a return of a few billion dollars of their own money. The most important thing that the president promised during his campaign and was reiterated later by himself and other officials was that unfair sanctions would be lifted. Frankly, if the sanctions are not terminated, we have achieved nothing.