A nuclear deal is certain to be clinched, says an expert

An Iranian expert in international affairs says that Iran and P5+1 will definitely strike a comprehensive final deal.

Abdolreza Farajirad, a former Iranian ambassador to Norway and Hungary, made the comment in an interview with fararu.ir on June 24 and added that the remaining obstacles which stand in the way and outside pressures by the Zionist and Arab lobbies can only delay the nuclear deal for a few days. The following is the translation of what else he said in the interview:

We are in the home stretch before the end-of-June deadline when intensive and prolonged nuclear talks are to come to an end, with sensitivity about the hurdles that lie ahead growing by the day.

Although there are concerns about such hurdles which come with the territory in any talks, I think the talks will eventually produce a result.

The two sides have managed to remove most of the obstacles during the previous rounds of talks with only one or two remaining. Differences over post-deal inspections [of Iran’s nuclear sites], especially access to undeclared sites among them military facilities, seem to be the major obstacle standing in the way of an agreement between Iran and P5+1 in the remaining time.

The two sides have so far managed to overcome serious and insurmountable obstacles and they [seem to] have the mechanisms available which could remove this obstacle [inspections of military sites] too.

If Iran and P5+1 fail to reach an agreement in the remaining days before the deadline over inspection of military centers, they can seriously think of a third way in order not to miss out on a golden opportunity that has opened up for striking a final deal.

Thanks to technological advances, there is no need for the physical presence of UN experts in the center(s) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seeks to inspect. In other words, Iran can send its trustworthy individual – supported by electronic imaging devices [which are capable of scanning the location] – to military sites, for instance, and that individual can do the [environmental] sampling, obviating the need for the physical presence of IAEA inspectors.

This method can meet the demand of P5+1 on inspections of military sites on the one hand, and can take into account Iran’s considerations on the other.

There are ample solutions to remove the remaining obstacles to the conclusion of a final deal. The two sides can take heed of such solutions if they are really determined to have a comprehensive deal clinched in the final days [of nuclear talks].

That the two sides are standing their ground in the few days before the deadline and try to have their own views accepted by the other side is quite natural. In any talks which are held at an international level, each side tries to leave the negotiating table gaining more concessions.

Even insistence by the two sides in the eleventh hour [of the talks] seems unlikely to cause them to lose out on their chance of cutting a deal. In the end, either side will take at least one step back in order not to miss this opportunity and achieve a final comprehensive deal, although the conclusion of a deal may be postponed for a few days.

The remaining obstacles together with outside pressures, including obstructionist measures by the Arab and Zionist lobbies, can delay the conclusion of the final deal only for a few days.

Unlike the Arab lobby, the Zionist lobby has made sure that conclusion of a deal is definite thus the Zionists do not go to any extreme lengths – like what they did in the past – to affect the talks one way or another because they know that their struggles will have no effect on the firm decision of the two sides, especially the US.

That’s why the Zionist lobby has piled its pressure on the French to throw an obstacle in the way of the talks and has become dismayed by the US and what Washington can do to render a deal with Iran unachievable.

The Arab lobby, however, is still hopeful that it can derail the talks in the few days before the deadline by applying pressure on the P5+1 members, especially the French and the Russians, promising financial incentives and spending petrodollars.

Throwing money at problems cannot – both in the long- and medium- term – play a role in setting macro strategies and policies. The dollars the Arabs spend seem unlikely to be able to do something to prevent a definite Iran- P5+1 agreement from happening. Their money can only postpone the conclusion of this agreement a few days.